It seems to me that there are a lot of myths going around out there about Iraq’s oil. People on the right want to say that Iraq should use its own oil money to finance its own reconstruction and security, and even possibly to help defray the American costs of the war. People on the left want to claim that the war was entirely about oil. So, lets look at really how much oil is in Iraq, and what kind of production that they can expect.

According to the World Factbook, Iraq produces about 2.2 million barrels of crude oil per day (2.2 million bbl/day), of which they export about 1.7 million bbl/day (meaning they consume 0.5 million bbl/day). It does note, that before the war production was about 2.8 million bbl/day, which if we assume constant consumption, means that they could export as much as 2.3 million bbl/day. The current price of crude oil is about $46.50, so to make the math work out better (and to be a little generous) we will multiply by $50, which means that a peacetime Iraq could gross about $115 million/day on its oil exports, or about $42 billion/year.

First of all, note that we have not accounted for the costs of drilling, refining and shipping the oil, which is going to eat into a large chunk of that money. Also, The World Factbook estimates that the Iraqi government spent about $13 billion last year, a figure which is likely to go up precipitously as the country starts to rebuild itself from the decades of tyranny and sanctions, and the most recent war. And, this is all assuming that the country maintains enough peace and stability to be able to maintain oil production at a high rate. So, all of that means that Iraq might be worth as much as a few billion dollars per year in profit to someone, be they foreign oil investors or the United States government.

That sounds like a lot of money until you consider the fact that the discretionary budget for the Untied States military is something like $400 billion and that the Bush Administration just asked for an additional $80 billion in reconstruction funds from Congress. In other words, the numbers just don’t add up for this war to be just about oil, much less for the United States to be able to tap into the Iraqi oil reserves to pay for the war or the reconstruction.

Yes, oil is important to Iraq and to the United States, and it certainly has a lot to do with our perpetual interest in the Middle East. But oil isn’t everything, and in the case of the Iraq war, it really amounts to relatively little.

 

This weekend, the Iraqi people go to the polls to choose their leaders. Let us all hope and pray that the elections are safe and secure and that, by some miracle, the leadership they choose is both powerful enough to maintain order and control and generous enough not to use that power to suppress opposition. But we need to separate wishful thinking from reality.

This election is about choosing leadership; no more, no less. It is not “the Iraqi people rising up to clearly state their desire for freedom and democracy” as many are likely to say. The Iraqi people are like all people; they want freedom and democracy, but they also want food and shelter and safety and trains that run on time. And when those things are threatened, freedom and democracy get forgotten pretty fast. How else do you explain the USA PATRIOT Act?

This election also does not guarantee legitimacy for the elected regime. First, there are too many question marks about it already, regarding Sunni participation and voter safety. Pro-American (or actual American) soldiers will be standing next to voting booths with big guns, and for good reason. But you can’t exactly say that those soldiers with big guns won’t be influencing the vote, merely by their presence. And if the Sunnis don’t turn out, or even if certain small but distinct segments of the Sunnis do not turn out, that will create an immediate legitimacy crisis for the new regime.

More importantly, as far as legitimacy goes, is how the new regime actually governs. Very quickly it will have to make a choice about its relationship with the United States. If it is too pro-American, it risks being labeled a puppet regime ala Weimar Germany or the Iranian Shah. On the other hand, if it is too anti-American, it risks its international legitimacy as well as the internal chaos of a premature American withdrawal. Similarly, it has to balance a willingness to tolerate and cooperate with the opposition with its desire to consolidate power and provide order.

In short, we need to wish all the best of luck to the Iraqi people and the winners of this weekend’s election. They are going to need it.

 

I’d like to touch briefly on a comment to Scott’s last post. The commentator states: “The obvious proxy for the cost prohibitive mechanism is outcomes. If people of different groups are able to achieve similar outcomes, we can rest assured that the doors are open. The problem is that the reverse logic doesn’t hold — if a group fails to be mobile, is it because of lack of opportunity, lack of ability, or lack of motivation? Hard to say.”

It is easier to describe a situation than to explain why it came to be. We can look at statistics that describe the way things are in terms of social mobility. Mike is correct. African Americans and Hispanics have been less mobile groups than other classes of people.

So, the commentator continues: “Right now Mike’s point is that looking at outcomes, it seems that the current system has failed (at least, that’s what I think he’s saying). While I agree that equality of opportunity (rather than outcome) is what we should be striving for, how can one ever measure the former? Is striving for equality of outcome as a way to ensure equality of opportunity a wise and/or useful societal goal?”

This argument is a tautology. Assumption 1: the success of the government depends on the outcomes. Assumption 2: if looking at the outcomes, certain groups are less mobile, then the government has failed. Conclusion: because the success of the government depends on the outcomes, you should focus only on equalizing the outcomes.

Further, the assumptions which have been credited to Mike, are inaccurate. This is the whole point about the extra-governmental factors influencing social mobility. Hypothetically, you could have complete equality of opportunity provided by the government and yet have divergent outcomes.

You could also have compete equality in outcome and have inequality of opportunity. For example, if affirmative action through a quota system worked and equalized the mobility percentages of African Americans and Hispanics as against Caucasians. It would work by increasing mobility of the former groups and decreasing mobility of the latter group. Affirmative action in this sense does little to limit the opportunities of rich and middle class Caucasians, but it does a pretty good job of limiting opportunities for poor Caucasians.

The government should focus on the opportunity aspect, because it can control that to a greater degree. Obviously, perfection will not be possible. A school in Seattle may have .4 desktop computers per student and good teachers while a school in Dothan, Alabama may have .2 desktop computers per student and mediocre teachers. The government can bridge the gap, but it can never make it competely equal. But this is not a fault, but just a manifestation of the fact of human imperfection.

I think the focus should be on how the government can come closest to providing equality of opportunity. The focus should not be on the outcomes because the outcomes do not reflect solely what the government can control.

 

First off, we all seem to agree that social mobility is a problem that needs to be addressed. Scott actually called me on something, so let me clarify on what I mean by “social mobility”. Scott asked the question is it better to live in a society where everyone is ok but social mobility is poor, or in a society where social mobility is high but life really sucks for those at the bottom. Being that I am responding to a lawyer, my answer will be to re-frame the question. All healthy societies ought to meet these two necessary conditions (both are vague, but I’m unconcerned with the details here):

1) The absolute poorest member of society is not overly concerned with food, shelter, healthcare, etc. Such that if he can’t work, they are provided for him, and if he can work, jobs are plentiful and pay enough to provide for the basics.

2) All members of society have opportunities to change classes during their own lifetime, in such a way that each member of society can imagine that their children will end up in the highest class. Social mobility shouldn’t be measured by the number of Horatio Algers; it should be measured by the number of poor kids who grow up to be middle class adults, and the number of middle class kids who grow up to be rich adults.

The first condition is the poverty debate: its extremely important, more needs to be done in America about it, but its not the current conversation. The second condition is social mobility, and this phrasing would imply that we need to address social mobility in two steps: getting the poor out of poverty and getting the middle class into wealth. Step 2 isn’t that bad in today’s society. It is difficult, but with enough brains and luck, going to an elite college or graduate program from a middle class background is pretty common. And once you are in those elite programs, wealth is simply a matter of perseverance and priority.

Step 1 is the toughest part in today’s society. The war on drugs is killing our poor, urban youth, especially African American males; too many poor kids end up in jail, and once there they have a hard time ever leaving it for terribly long. Our healthcare system punishes people for having jobs, as the poorest have Medicaid but those working minimum wage have nothing. And to this day, our schools in poor areas are underfunded, overcrowded and understaffed. So how do you increase social mobility? I want to tax the upper classes to pay for drug rehab and education programs, universal healthcare, and schools.

So, I’ll leave off there for now, although I have a lot more to say about those solutions and those taxes if the conversation continues that direction.

 

Man, I don’t even know where to start on this topic. Well, okay, I do, but it’s not a product of any original thought on my part. I should start by linking to two articles, one in the Economist (sub. req.) and an op/ed by David Brooks in the NYT/IHT. One or both of these was the inspiration for Mike’s initial question, I suspect…

Here’s a quick-hit summary of the two articles: Income disparity has spiked to incredibly high levels recently. Social mobility may or may not have decreased lately, but in any case it has not spiked to keep pace with the increase in income disparity. Americans tend not to recognize this as a problem, for a couple reasons: 1) the American Dream/Horatio Alger myth is more or less still a potent meme, and 2) American are still hypercompetitive — just within their social class rather than between classes (think rich New Yorkers fighting to get their toddlers into prestigious preschools, or middle-class suburban teenagers fighting for college admissions [disclosure: that was me ten years ago]). Education isn’t the silver bullet it once was back when Progressives like Teddy Roosevelt roamed the earth, because — among other reasons — there’s a higher base of education across the country now and education no longer seems sufficient to bridge class divides.

Fair enough. Those are my base assumptions — quibble with them if you’d like.

Hiren says that social mobility and income disparity should be divorced conceptually. Mike says that they’re related and driven by the same forces. Me? I’ll take the lawyer’s way out and say that they’re both partially correct and that we need to add confusing analysis. I think it’s pretty clear that the two phenomena are driven by the same underlying forces, but that policymakers should place different priorities on them.

The discussion seems to be focusing more on social mobility, which is fine with me because it’s more interesting personally. But let me say this about income disparity: I don’t care about income disparity as much if the poorest elements of American society are provided for in the most basic of ways. That is, even if numerically the spread between our society’s richest and poorest is roughly identical to the spread around the turn of the (last) century or the Depression, I’m less concerned about it right now. Why? Well, by and large: The poor of our nation now are no longer sharecroppers. They are no longer crammed into tenements in dramatically unsanitary conditions. Child labor no longer exists/is prevalent. Education is available and used by our nation’s children until at least their teenage years, and usually beyond that. Discrimination in education and employment is no longer codified in law.

[Important caveat: I'm in no way asserting that such things no longer exist in the US. They do, and they are tragic, and we and our government should fight them at every turn. However, I feel quite comfortable in asserting that these practices are dramatically less prevalent than they were a century ago, which is the point I wish to make.]

Viewed from an absolute sense, we’re better off now than we were a century ago. We’ve taken what were the very bottom levels of our society socioeconomically and eradicated them. That we might have the same relative disparity currently simply means we’ve added commensurately higher levels of the hyperwealthy — which is a trade-off I’ll take every time. Income disparity isn’t as much of a concern as where the floor of that comparison exists absolutely. At least to me.

I’m tired now, and don’t have my thoughts put together on social mobility, so I’ll address it in a later post. Here’s what I’ll be thinking about, though:

  • Mike’s statement that “Social mobility requires that money from the upper-classes be reinvested into the lower classes.” Tentatively, I’m thinking that’s an incomplete statement — too specific. Legacy university admissions is my counterexample at the moment — fixing whatever problems they may cause wouldn’t require redistribution of income.
  • Hiren’s statement that “the choice to move up the ladder is affected by much more than whether the government provides the mechanism to move up the ladder.” Again, seems too broad — “much more” seems like an exaggeration. Hiren’s example seems to contain the seeds of its counterexample — had the government not provided the educational system within which our stereotypical Jewish immigrants succeeded, wouldn’t those immigrants been in largely the same boat as our stereotypical Italian immigrants, assuming (foolishly and unreasonably) that all other things were equal?
  • What’s better, assuming the total societal weath is equal: a society with high social mobility but a low income floor, or a society with low social mobility but a higher income floor? (Would you rather have a shot at being a warlord in a banana republic, or a safe life as a paper-shuffler in a post-industrial republic?) Does income disparity factor into this at all?
  • Inheritance taxes seem really unfair to me. I don’t buy Mike’s explanation at all — the parent’s incentive to earn to provide for their children’s and family’s future is a prime motivator, right? Isn’t taking away a chunk of what those individuals earned upon an arbitrary event like death just so whatever progeny they might have can be reset to zero pretty much antithetical to the American Dream — at the very least for the deceased? If it’s just redistribution of income you want, then monkey with the tax rates as I earn the dough — don’t take it away from me after I’ve already got it in my grubby little lawyer hands. I was glad to see the estate tax go away; the whole concept gives me the willies.
  • How do you go about goosing social mobility? Is progressive taxation itself enough? Where should we redistribute the income (grants in kind? investment in government programs?)? Can the education system be tweaked to get the desired results? What about non-financial measures (affirmative action/elimination of legacies/etc.)?

To be continued… (Feel free to jump in during the interim, though! )

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