The Vietnam War was a debacle for military strategists and planners. The Pentagon entered that war thinking along the lines of most World War II era strategists: the guy with the biggest guns and the most men at the point of contact will win most fights. But in Vietnam, we out-manned and out-gunned our opponent consistently, and we won virtually every battle (or conflict that could reasonably be called a battle) that we fought… and yet we lost. So after the war, Pentagon strategists insisted upon learning from their defeats. And while they did dedicate some amount of time and energy to developing a more flexible, professional fighting force, they also wanted to ensure that they wouldn’t end up in a Vietnam-like situation ever again.
And so arose the Powell Doctrine. The Powell Doctrine was an attempt to understand both World War II success and Vietnam failure, and apply those lessons to future conflicts. Things that we did in World War II were good; things that we did in the Vietnam War were bad. Therefore, we should only go to war if the following conditions are met:
- All Strategic and Political Objectives have been clearly defined.
- Military Force is required to fulfill an important National Security goal.
- We have broad domestic and international support for our actions.
- We have well thought-out exit strategies and contingency plans.
- Overwhelming military force can be applied.
The pinnacle of the Powell Doctrine was the 1991 Gulf War. We knew what we wanted, had a good plan, got everyone on board, kicked some serious butt, and went home. It was a great success, and all of the Powell Doctrine folks felt that they had finally gotten rid of the Vietnam War albatross; they knew how to approach warfare.
But not everyone bought into the Powell Doctrine. Continue reading »
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